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a call to resi~t
illegitimate authority

November 30, 1975 _ 720 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 4, Cambridge, Massachusetts 4198

SCAR
NEW DIRECTIONS
(The following article is taken from the November issue of NEPA News: The Voice of the North
East Prisoners Association. SCAR--Statewide
Correctional Alliance for Reform--is a prison
group in Maine that Resist has supported in the
past. See Newsletter #80.)
YESTERDAY
Int rod11c tion
SCAR 11as been in exisLence now for over two
and one half ears. We came together as a group
of friends who had shared a common prison experience and who had a corrun:! 1 ment to changing the conditions in pdson that we had seen. Since that
tiny beginning SCAR's i.;oa1s have constantly
changed from "pd son 1 ef ut,n" to "social change"
and from a group of f .dends to a growing network of dedicated people committed to developing
an organization that can accomplish the goals of
social change.
In this article we will try to show, briefly,
this process of change that SCAR has been through,
from "liberal refonnis t" to revolutionary. We
feel that the process is a natural one that will
happen to any group that is formed to deal with
changing the system-•assuming that is that the
group has a real commitment to its goals, takes
the time to study the causes of the problem, and
is unafraid of the solution. In our case, our
goals were to make the lives of prisoners better.
In time these goals grew to our wanting to have
fewer prisoners and then to questions about why
there was so much crime, so many prisoners. At
that point it was no longer sufficient for us
that prisons be made better. That seemed like a
goal that only aggravated the problem: prisons
needed to be eliminated.
Beyond that, it is time that the real-criminals
be put in jail. History's great robbers, murderers, and rapists: the Rockefellers, Mellons,
Duponts, and their agents Nixon, Ford, et al.,
are still free. When these people or others
like them no l,>nger own America, when they are
driven from their palaces and from the control
of our destinies, we can begin anew. Through a
united effort, the poor and working people of
this country can creat a new social order, one
which will put the resources and workplaces of
our country into the hands of the people. A
(continued on page 4)

THE CIVIL WAR
IN LEBANON
(The author of the following art!cle•-the 2nd
part of which will come in the next issue of
the Newsletter--is the General Secretary of the
International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace. The essay is a somewhat shortened
version of an ICDP report on the situation in
Lebanon.)
The civil war in Lebanon, in which 6,000
people were killed and 20,000 wounded between
April 13 and October 24, has been generally presented in the Western Press as a religious war
between Christians and Moslems.
When Lebanon became independent in 1943,
the government of the country was carefully divided between leaders of the different confessions.
These were:
The Maronite Christians, who follow the
eastern rites of the Church, but are accepted by Rome;
The Sunni or orthodox Moslems;
The Shi-ite Moslems, a schismatic sect of
Islam which after the death of Mohannned
supported the claims of his son•in•law,
Ali, to the Caliphate and which, unlike the
Sunnis, rejects the principle of election
of the Caliph, believing that only the pro•
phet's direct descendants are worthy to
hold that position;
The Druses, another Islamic sect;
Various other religious and ethnic groups,
such as the Kurds.
'lllis accomodation between religions was laid
down in two conat.1.tutions, one written, dating
back to 1926; the other oral, the National Pact
of 1943. According to this Pact all the offices
of the State, of the Government, and of the
Parliament are carefully divided among the different confessions, on a ration of six Ghristians
to five Moslems. How far this ratio is still
fair is difficult to judge since there has been
no census for many years. Certainly the number
of Moslems has increased, especially of the Shiites (they are the poorest of the Moslem com•
munities and few of them ~migrated, unlike the
Sunnis and the Christians). 'lllere is little
doubt that the 1-bslems are in the majority.
(continued on page 2)

(LEBANON continued)
It was understood that the Presidency of
the Republic and the Command of the Army should
go to the Maronites, that the Prime Minister
should be a Sunni, the President of the Republic
a Shi•ite, and the Chief of Staff a Druse. So
at present the President is a Maronite, Suleiman
Frangieh and the Prime Minister a Sunni, from
Tripoli, Rashid Karami. But, of course, each of
these appointees had to le acceptable to the others.

a mass party after the June 1967 war. Their
arms are said to come down the ''Ho Chi Minh
Trail" from Syria into South Lebanon.
But the mixture is much more complex than
it seems. One of the leaders of the Phalangists
is a Moslem Sheikh, Kazim El Khalil. Jumblatt
is a leader of the Druse. One of the elected
leaders of the Nasserites is a Christian, Najah
Wakim. 'Iwo of the leaders of the orthodox Communists, George Hawi and Nicola El Shawi, are
Christians. The civil war is omething much wider
than a confrontation between two faiths. Once
one begins to examine the class basis of the two
communities, it becomes clear that, to a large
extent, the war is a confrontation between social
classes, between the ''haves" and the ''have-nots"
in Lebanon. This is exposed very clearly by
Rouleau in the second of Le Monde articles •• ••
This conflect between classes, between the indecently rich Christians and the indecently poor
Moslems is the real cause of the civil war. To
a considerable degree, the present crisis in
world capitalism has created a sitµation in which
it became inevitable. Just as the Indochinese
Communist Party was first formed and put down its
first roots during the Depression of the late
20's and early 30's, when the first risings against
the French took place in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, so
the depression of the 70's made the sufferings of
the Moslem poor of Lebanon insupportable. Also,
the multinationalisation of American capitalism,
and especially of its banking system, has contri-buted to the decline in the financial role of the
Lebanese entrepreneurs, encouraging extremist
measures in order for them to perpetuate their
affluence.

'Ihe system is archaic. It tends to place
power in the hands of mediocre and corrupt men.
It leads to endless bureaucratic delays, to careful avoidance of long-needed reforms and to control of the regime by feudal lords and rich
business men. They dominate the Parliament and
owe their election to the support of pressure
groups, plus a liberal expenditure of bribes.
Eric Rouleau, in five exceptionally well-informed
articles in Le 1-hnde(September 20 - 25) • • • ,
told of one ~ndiclate in the last election who
spent 600,000 French franks (about $120,000) in
one week. When times are difficult, the Parliament simply does not meet and the careful.balancing of structures has )ust not worked, in terms
of effective government. Yet, while the two
contending sides in the civil war are the extremist Christians, the Phalangist (Kataib) and
the Moslem Left, this is not the whole story.
The Christian Right. The Phalangists, led
by Pierre Gemayel operate under the slogan of
"God, the Family, the Fatherland". They are
not by any means the most extreme. To their right
are the Front of Defenders of the Cedars, which
operates clandestinely, and the Maronite League,
said to be financed by the Order of Maronite
Monks. '!heir various militia are trained at
three camps in Jordan and apparently get their
arms from the Lebanese Army (80% of its officers
are Christians)and from some mysterious sources
in Western Europe.
But, in addition, there are
innumerable private armies. Everyone important,
landowners, country squires, feudal chiefs, they
all have their own militia. In Zghorta, a
Christian village near Tripoli, the birtl\,lace
of the President, Suleiman Frangieh, the five
big families all have their own militia and one
of them is led by the President's son, Tony
Fangieh • Karami has his in Tripoli and the
Minister of the Interior, formerly President,
Camille Chamoun, has a personal guard of some
hundreds of men. Rouleau tells of one independent Maronite business man, Henri Sfeir, who has
two hundred shock troops centred on his land,
commanded by a French mercenary, Rene Gaudet,
formerly a paratrooper in the French Foreign
Legion who fought in Korea, in Indochina, in
Algeria, then for Tshombe in the Congo, and now
in Lebanon.
The Moslem Left. 'Ihe Left consists of a
number of groups, joined in a united front under
the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, head of the
Progressive Socialis~ Party. In addition there
is an orthodox Communist Party, led by George
Hawi, an independent Communist Party, three Nasserite groups (roughly centre, Right, and Left),
and two Ba 1 athist groups, one pro-Syrian, the
other pro-Iraq. Their strength has increaaed a
great deal over the past ten years, especially
since the Communist Party turned itself into

The Role and Significance of the PLO and Syria.
But this is not all. There is a third ingredient
in the civil war. The Phalangists and their allies
are bitterly apposed to the Palestinians, not only
to their presence in Lebanon, but to the rights
and autonomy they hold under the C~iro Agreement
of 1969 which gave the PW control over their peo•
ple and of their forces in the various Arab countries in which they are exiled. The Phalangists
want to force the Palestinians to integrate, to
accept Lebanese nationality, the authorit/ of the
Lebanese regime, and to disband their forces - in
fact, to renounce their national rights. The attacks on the Palestinian camps in 1973 were an
abortive attempt ta achieve this, like Hussein's
more effective assault in 1970 on the camps in
Jordan.
After the October war, they had some reason
to hope that the establishment of a Palestinian
state on the West Bank and in Gaza and East Jerusalem would rid them of most of their unpopular
guests. But.this hope has receded and the conclusion of the recent Interim Agreement between
:gypt and Israel finally convinced them that this
was not going to happen, or at least, not for
several years. The occasion was marked, incidentally, by an escalation of the civil war in the
North around Tripoli and Zghorta.
The Phalangists, therefore, have much in common with the Israelis, though they are careful not
to say so openly. The Israelis are not so modest
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and have overtly supported the Christians in their
press, by incursions into South Lebanon at strategic moments, and by kidnapping Palestinian leaders in the streets of Beirut. The former Moslem
Prime Minister, Ra.schid El Solh, when he was
forced to resign on May 15, specifically accused
the Phalangists of effectively supported Israel
in their anti-Palestiniansim. Their arms, he
said, were trained on the fedayin, while the
fedayin arms were trained on the Israelis. There
is also a curious resemblance between the Phalangist hawks and Israeli hawks. '!hey talk about the
Moslems and the Palestinians with much the same
arrogance and disdain as the Israelis use both
towards Palestinians in Israel and in the Occupied Territories, and to their own Oriental Jews.
The Christians are fearful of the links between
the Palestinian and their own Moslem poor and are
so equivocal :tn their support of the Palestinians
and the PLO that they can, justly, be accused of
being pro-Israel.

which even Hussein had to accept• recognised the
PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people. They alread have problems
with Jordan, where Hussein tries to insist that
the camps must be under the authority of the Jor•
danian government. If the PLO lost control in
Lebanon, this would seriously undermine both agreements and at a crucial moment when, on the one
hand they are winning more and more recognition
throughout the world and, on the other, they are
threateded by the implications of the Interim
Agreement between Egypt and Israel.
The same applies to Syria, but in a different
way. The Interim Agreement has been bitterly attacked both in Syria and by the PLO. They see it,
with much justice, as a barrier to further Israeli
withdrawals either from the Golan Heights or from
Occupied Palestine. Reacting to Arab criticisms
and, in some cases, to their embarrassed silence,
Sadat has tried hard to pretend that the Agreement
includes commitments for discussions on further
withdrawals. Indeed, on the eve of the Agreement,
Sadat wrote to Arafat reassuring him that this was
specifically mentioned in it; but when the text
was published, it was not in fact there and the
Israelis quickly made it clear that so far as th~y
were concerned there is.no conmdtment whatsoever.

But the PLO is only too well aware that they
are a major target for the Kataib, that one of
their major aims is to reduce the status of the
PLO, to rob it of its autonomy, and to disarm it.
They have, therefore, been very careful not to get
involved in the civil war, '1hey have fought only
when thefr camps were attacked,. e.g., during the
fighting in the North when their camp at Naher El
Bared was attacked and was defended by the PID
Third Regiment, and - again - when the Sabra area
of Beirut was rocketed and mortared. They have
kept to a highly diplomatic role, helping to get
the two sides together, but rejecting all attempts
to involve them in the war.
Their chief concern is to protect their shield
and buckler, the Cairo Agreement of 1969 and the
Rabat Agreement of 1974• The former gave them ad•
ministrative control of their people and their
camps in all Arab countries• and the latter -
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So if Syrian and Palestinian claims are buried
and Syria is left wide open to an Israeli attack,
any changes in Lebanon constitute a real threat
to the security of Syria. For if Syria were at~
tacked by Israel, even if Sadat was forced to come
in by his own army, Egypt would be of little help.
For its own military strength has been greatly reduced by its switch from Soviet to Western supplies
of weapons. It is not only that she has still not
received any definite commitments from the US
(though it seems likely that she will get some
from Britain and France with Kissinger's blessing),
the fact is that it takes several years, at least,
five and probably more, for an army to ~ecome effective with a new weapons system. Egypt is one
of the few powers with auajor army to change sup•
pliers and she has done it twice: once from British to Soviet, now from Soviet to a mixture of
Western European arms and, Sadat hopes, eventually
American.
In this situation, the civil war in Lebanon
is amjor threat to Syria. Any weakening of the
PLO position there, any rightwing Christian takeover of the country, any partition of Lebanon
would clearly increase their danger and the possibility of an Israeli attack through the soft
underbelly of Southern Lebanon, rather than down
the Golan Heights. While the Syrian army is
clearly strong enough nowadays not to succumb to
a six-day blitzkrieg, there is no doubt that
Israel would like to seize the opportunity to
wipe out their remaining advePsary, if they felt
able to defy Washington, for instance during an
election year! This suspicion is confirmed by
a staterrent in the Israeli newspaper, Ha'aretz in
October that the US ambassado~ in Tel Aviv had
sent Rabin a warning against intervention in
Lebanon.
(continued on page 7)

(SCAR continued)
~ociety can be forged which will redirect this
nation's wealth avay from the pockets of the
rich and the super-rich. With th.at we can
guarantee the well•being of every human being a•
mong us, and see that all will have the basic
necessities of life and the ~portunity to develop and grow. We can end, once and for all, a
country built on pro.fit, competition, and greed,
and replace it with a Peoples' Republic founded
on the principles of compassion, cooperation,
and collective ownership.

The fourth issue of the paper, which was
free, was not only the largest and best put together paper that we had done to that point
but in many ways was the strongest. That issue
was to be the last in a chapter in SCAR's development, yet in many ways it also represented
the beginnings of some new currents within SCAR.
For instance, the fourth issue was the first
in which we began to include a sixable amount
of prison news from other states. Even though
our orientation as an organization was increasinglt toward the community, the paper only included one page (out of 26) of community news
other than our own. Unable, because of our
lack of clarity, to define ourselves, the paper
could neither be a tool to development of a
strong mass organization in Maine nor have the
total eq>hasis on the prison struggle that a
national prisoner movement paper must have.

At that point, the problem of prisons and a
thousand other social problems of today will
~ave begun to fade into history.
'lhe requirement for making this occur is the
total commitment of each of us to the struggle
now going on.

The fifth issue of the paper, published in
October of 1974 (nearly 5 months after the fourth
issue) was entitled Volume 2, Number 1, and
showed a very distinct break from the fourth.
Because the issue of the focus and future of the
organization had not been resolved, the issue
of how tbe paper should serve those goals was
still unclear. '!here was a decided shift in
that issue toward a more broadly~focused paper
that could be used as an organizational andeducational tool for the development of a strong
mass organization in our state. This was to be
the beginning of a trend in the organization
which continues today. The decision on which
path we should take was being made.

LIBERALISM TO RADICALISM

In the beginning our focus was almost entirely on the need to make ''better" the prison
environment. We talked about ''half-way houses",
better Programs, court monitors, legislation,
litigation, and negotiation. In our first year
we were able to buy a farm, which we stated we
would turn into a convict-ex-convict run half•
way house. We set into motion two independent
Court Monitoring projects in an effort to developing momentum and debate around prison issues.
At that time we were speaking all over the state
on the need for better prisons.

COMING INTO FOCUS
As we moved into our third year a clear
direction had begun to eu.rge. We had come to
see the need to expand our work in the comnunity
and we had committed ourselves to building a
strong organization in Maine. This last point
was most important because it stated once and for
all that our organization would be built from the
ground up not the top down. That is not to say
that we underestimate the need for national level
work, we don't. Butt strong national organizations
do not merely appear, they are the result of
serious long-term local work. Until local constituencies are developed, political education
done and organuational skills aquired potent
national work is a myth.

'lhe first SCAR'd Times (The Voice of SCAR)
which appeared in May of 1973 (about 5 months
after SCAR was formed) completely reflected both
our liberal reformism and our quickly awakening
radicalism. While we had two full pages (out of
16) dealing with entirely our legislative bills,
the papers first editorial clearly stated that
better prisons simply were not enough and implied
that a redistribution of wealth may be necessary.
As that summer continued this process of radical•
ization within SCAR also continued. We were
greatly affected both by new members who had
experience in other struggles and by the spirit
and writings of Brother George Jackson, political
prisoner, and revolutionary theoretician for the
Black Panther Party before he was murdered in
prison. When the second SCAR' d Times emerged
in September of 1973 its feature was entitled
"SCAR: In the spirit of George Jackson." Another
feature was entitled: "Prisons: the menace of
liberal re form." 'lhe full shift away from
liberalism had run its course.

These decisions, to broaden our work in the
communities and to focus on Maine were the first
steps leading us to where we are today.

'!ODAY: A PERIOD OF SELF-CRITICISM
It is a coumonly shared feeling that we tend
to come off as very elitist. We are oftentimes
rivetted to what interests S!. politically rather
than what are the concrete demands and aspirations
of the people. Because of this we have failed
tot or in some cases have been unable to, truly
become a part of (submerge ourselves among) the
people. Instead of placing ourselves at the
direct service of the people we have many times
held ourselves above them. This is a form of
eliti.sm that must be struggled with if we hope
to build and be among the frontline forces of
the people's movement. Our discussions of elitism
have forced us to look at our attitudes, many of
which we hold subconcsiouslyt that serve to set
us apart from the people.

Since those decisions were made• we have
concentrated our efforts in three areas in order
to strengthen our core and set the stage for
continued growth. '!hose three areas are:
1) Sustaining a full-time, independent core
group or cadre that can work for the revolution
without working for the system. This has involved the collective buying of a house capable of
housing twenty SCAR members.
2) Developing a financial base for the organization that vill free us from any dependency on
the system, and place our financial support in
the hands of the people.
3) Reconstructing our paper to serve the organization! needs+ 'lhis has illvolved giving it a
much greater local emphasis, using it to educate
our readers more effectively, and gathering support and new members.

The most obvious example of such an attitude
is our anti-working class views. Many of us,
coming from the movement of the 60' s or the
"counter-culture" have very distinct attitudes
about working people. Because of the materialist,
racist~ or sexist values that many working people
exhibit as a result of life within this society,
we tend to discount them as essentially counterrevolutionary. '!his view fails to take into account the effect that changing conditions have
(and are presently having) on people. It also
fails to see the role that these same people will
and must play in the coming struggle.

'lhese are three priorities of our organization at thi.s point, along with raising the political level of members individually and of the
organization as a whole.
'llle results, after a great deal of struggle
have been more than we have hoped for. Aside
from purchasing our own apartment building we
have made important strides towards economic
self-sufficiency. In additiont we have greatly
improved our paper, which has helped to draw
new people to our group and has opened us to
many new possibilities.

Beyond those problems, we still have problems
with macho-ness, sexism within our group, and
with age-ism. 'lhese are problems that are being
dealt with through on-going criticism and selfcriticism.

We are now passing through a period of intense self-criticism, re-analyzing our past
mistakes, our work habits~ and our practice.
We see this as a necessary prelude to the work
ahead of us. 'lhis period has meant shutting
down all of our activities> including the center,
the paper, and our program in order to give full
attention to the questions of past mistakes and
our future directions. Listed below are some
of the points that we have been discuss~ng and
some initial conclus!ons that we have reached.

SURVIVAL PRO GRAMS

In re-analyzing our programs, two things
became clear. First, these programs were not
really "survival" programs in the sense that
they did not involve, grow from resources that
are avilable to the people and they did not actively ~nough involve the people who benefitted
from the programs,. We were providing the resources,
the timet and the energy. We were entirely supparting the programs. It was clear that without
our work the programs would collapse. Instead
of coUlllunity supported survival programs we were
operating "social Welfare" programs. And we,
through our increasing work in these areas were
becoming social welfare workers I

These points relate directly to SCAR but in
many cases they are equally applicable to other
groups on the Left. For this reason they deserve
the attention of all of us.

The second point about these programs is that
we had not used these programs either to do political education around or to organize with. 'lhis
helped to make them seem even more like social
welfare programs.

I

I

Through the next year we were to struggle
with our direction. Should we become a Maine•
based political organization, working in our
communities with poor and working people or
should we continue as an organization dealing
primarily with the prison struggle? Undecisive
unable to set a clear direction, we probably
lost effectiveness in each area through our
second year. This was best reflected in our
paper, the SCAR'd Times.
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As of this time we have halted these programs and have scheduled new meetings of those
who use the programs. If there is sufficient
interest on the part of those who benefit from
particular survival programs then those will
be started again.
(continued next page)
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(SCAR concluded)
PRISON WORK
After a great deal of discussion about our
prison work and a lot of honest criticism we
h~ve arrived at_the following conclusions:
l) that we have made serious errors in the past
in raising the political consciousness of prisoners.
In particular we have played on the vangeful,
negative or destructive attitudes that prison
life breeds. We have failed to,devel0pe true
class consciousness and an understanding of the
nature of capitalism and its consequences. We
have equally failed to explain alternatives to
capitalism, the science and practical application
of socialism.
2) we have elevated prisoners, allowing them to
fall into believing that they are the vanguard
of the struggle. This has helped give rise to
the false notion of prisoners as an independent
class, above the masses of poor and working
people. As a result, prisoners are hitting the
streets with no conmitment to the long-range
struggle ahead in the conmunities, the factories,
the schools, and the offices. Without any indepth class consciousness, many recently released
prisoners who have become aware are becoming to
easil7 disillusioned after their release.
We have agreed that we on the outside need
to raise our own political levels so that these
errors may be corrected.
3) in our day to day work in the prison we feel
that we have not been demanding enough of the
brothers inside. While we are extremely demanding of each other on the outside, .articularly
about petty hassles with cops or~ ~ting high,
we have allowed these things to go~ within the
prison without any serious comradely ~riticism.
This is in large part due to our respect for the
brothers and our own unwillingness to criticize

them because their "oppression is greater than
ours."
This last point, an attutude which is clearly
incorrect has been extremely harmful in our in•
tenial/external relationships and in attempts to
move our work forward. These problems are now
being openly discussed with our intenial membership in order to correct our work in the prisons.
It is not without a struggle that we come to
these conclusions about our past work. Such a
process can be quite painful and easily resiste4.
But in order that the struggle will continue to
advance, mistakes have to be corrected, criticisms
have to be made, and new methods created. In our
case it was a necessary struggle, to clean "the
house" and set the stage for us to begin again
and to rebuild from the solid foundation of past
experience.
AND TOIDRROW

NEW DIRECTIONS
We had brought ourselves to a point where
we were able to ask this questions: If we were
to start all over again having the resources
that we have now (a center, newspaper, house,
vehicles, small press, office equipment, and
some money and practical knowledge) what would
we do? The response ranged from concentrating

6

on one city to developing a single statewide
group working in many different issues. Others
thought we shouldn't do anything but continue
the re-evaluation for a while. One person suggested concentrating on building more collectives.
One thing was clear, we all felt we should take
advantage of the time to broaden our work and our
goals.
We began to talk about the condition of the
Left and of progressive forces in our state.
There are a multitude of groups; welfare groups,
tenants, women, study groups• land groups, a
citizens economic connnittee, new militant labor
groups and unions, ourselves and others.
The problem is that there is very little
unity among the various groups. Each is so caught
up in their own particular issue that there exists
very little view of these issues as inter-related,
as affecting all poor and working people as a
class. Without this class perspective to unify
the groups and provide a clear sense of the sources
of the problems each group seemed locked into
short-range reformist solutions.
These tactics represent a serious problem
in a time of rapidly changing social/economic
and political conditions such as is happening
today. Poor and working people are looking for
answers. They are prepared, many of them, for
radical solutions if necessary. Yet the progressive forces, which could command a leading position
in overcoming these problems, are in a state of
disarray.

(LEBANON continued)
As we began to examine the possibilities for
organizing a single statewide progressive organization the question of what we would do if we
started all over again became clear. We would
invest a substantial amount of our time and energy
to the founding of just such an organization.
Th.e work of the various existing organizations
could in time be made the work of committees of
a single larger organization. Day to day work
would become part of a strategy for long-range
goals. Ongoing political education, through a
single newspaper and study groups could be initiated Th.e new unity could help to provide new
fuel to the already existing work. In time and
with a great deal of struggle an organization
could be develaped that would speak to poor and
working people throughout the state. With that,
we could begin in earnest to deal with the problems
that we all face.

Th.at has become the vision before us. It is
a road filled with many questions that need to be
answered. We are in agreement that the time is
rJ:ght and we are clear about what we should do.

HCM DOES

nus

REI.A 'IE TO YOU

Similar activity is going on all over the
country and more people are needed to join the
struggle. Many people ask us, what can I do
when I get out? or if they're already out, what
can I do now? Th.e answer is fairly simple.
Many more organizations like SCAR have to be
developed, collectives formed, newspapers printed.
Existing organizations need more peaple. If you
work, join a union and become active in it. If
there's no union, get together with others and
form one. If you're in prison now form an organization (SCAR was an inmate counci1 before
it was on the street.) Form study groups so that
you can understand better what we're up against.
For starters you can read this paper real carefully and respond with your thoughts on various
articles. How can we make the paper better?
Whats good about it? How do we use the paper
to bring more people into the struggle? These
are questions that we all have to answer, papers
like this are our tools, groups like SCAR are
our organizations, and this is our movement.
It only gets as far as we push it. Nobody gives
us the answers in advance. It demands of us that
we be creative and we keep moving!

Th.e Syrians have, therefore, intervened diplomatically at crucial moments. When Raschid El
Sohl, the Sunni ?-bslem Prime Minister, was forced
to resign in May, following the resignation of six
of his ministers, and a military government was
appointed by the Maronite President, Suleiman
Frangieh, on May 23, they reacted very promptly.
Since some 80% of the army's officers are Christians, there was an immediate hostile reaction
from the Moslem Left, and even from some of the
moderate Christians. Th.e new Prime Minister,
Noureddin Rifai, tried to counter this and apposition from the PLO by insisting that he did
not reject the Cairo Agreement and his Minister
of Information, Colonel Moussa Kinna'an, insisted that they did not question the status of the
PLO forces as defined in that agreement.
Syria reacted with a threat to intervene
to preserve the stability and security of Lebanon and the Foreign Minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam, arrived in Beirut on May 24. As Le Monde
emphasised in a report from Beirut (May 27):
"Th.e political, economic and military links between Lebanon and Syria are much too close for any
situation in Beirut which is condemned in Damas•
cus to last very long. In the course of long
conversations with President Frangieh, the Syrian
representative let it be known clearly that his
country could not allow the outbreak of civil
war in Lebanon - which seemed to him imminent without ititervening directly." At that crucial
moment the Lebanese army was even forced to respond to a conveniently timed Israeli attack a~
cross the South Lebanese border. For the first
time for a long period, it reacted and even
killed two Israeli soldiers. But this was not
eni;ugh to save the military government. It took
over on May 23: three days later it resigned. On
May 29, a much more acceptable Prime Minister was
appointed, the Sunni Moslem from Tripoli, Rashid
Karami.
(continued next issue)

We at SCAR are particularly interested in
your thoughts on what is outlined in this article.
We welcome correspondence on any questions that
you have and will send our newsletter to anyone
who would like to follow the week to week life
of our work.
Beirut firemen fight downtown blaze
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FEMINIST HISTORY RESEARCH PROJECT
P.O. BOX 1156
TOPANGA, CALIFORNIA 90290
(213) 4f>5-1283

Dear Friends:
At the end of 1972, when Ann Forfreedom and
I started the Feminist Histo.ry Research Project
as a program of the Women's Center, you helped us
launch it with your financial support. Since
then, I have begged and borrowed, though not
stolen, and have managed to keep the project alive.
I_am happy to repi>rt, three years later, successJ

In the course of these three years, several
hundred hours of interviews have been recorded,
both by myself and students, with a range of women about their lives and activities in the early
-20th century. These interviews constitute an
important primary source in women's history and
are being increasingly recognized as such. Several university libraries have acquired some of
these taped interviews, doctoral candidates and
ether researchers have used portions of them, the
Cornell Women's Trade Union Project has incorporated several into their classroom instructional
material. Additionally, in cooperation with the
University of California Berkeley Bancroft Library,
a volume of our suffrage interviews has been produced (under their Rockefeller-funded Suffragist
Project) and will be deposited in seven major
university archives.
Not only is the Feminist History Research
Project building an important archive, but we are
also training others, in various parts of the
country both to conduct oral history interviews
with women and to utilize the technique as a
teaching tool in women's studies. In 1974 I designed a Women's Studies Oral History course
which was offered in the Winter and Fall quarters
at UCLA. Th.is course has become a model for
Women's Studies instructors at various schools,
and I am hopeful that it might ultimately be accepted as one of the core courses in the UCLA
Women's Studies Program. I am working with Women's Studies at California State University,
Long Beach, to introduce a similar course into
their program. Aditionally, I have facilitated
workshops in an effort to share my skills and
experiences with an increasing number of women
interested in utilizing the oral history inter•
view to develop a new perspective on women's
history.
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Although the FHRP has been an important influence in these more academic pursuits, perhaps
our most exciting accomplishments are in more
popular, accessible programs. In an effort to
utilize the oral history material for educational
purposes, I introduced a tape/slide program based
on our suffrage interviews. This program (which
Provides just about our only source of income at
the moment) is, I hope, the first in a series of
"living history" programs. Though these programs
are more exciting than the print form, and utilize
the potential of the oral history interviews in
ways that the print form cannot, they obviously
reach fewer people. However, with the upcoming
spring publication of a volume of suffrage inter-views, this material will also be available to a
wider audience. The April 1976 Vintage publication of From Parlor to Prison: Five American Suf•
fragists Talk about Their Lives represents a real
breakthrough for the project and, I hope, will
both provide some income and open the way to further publishing efforts.
Convinced that the FHRP is a worthy enterprise and here to stay, in September it was incorporated in its own right in the state of
California as a non-profit corporation. I want
to thank you for your initial support which helped
to make the FHRP a reality. Th.e faith that you
placed in what might have been an idle dream on
my part has helped to make the Feminist History
Research Projec tl. an important part of the effort
to redefine woman's past.
Sincerely,

